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In 1930 a young Dutch scholar named W.F. Wertheim published his J.D.-dissertation
Aansprakelijkheid voor schade buiten overeenkomst (Extra-contractual liability for
damage).
1
This dissertation did not attract much attention, and the author himself hardly did any
further research on its topic. Taking in mind the development of law-and-economics
some decades later, however, the book is highly remarkable. Long before the
modern economic analysis of law was to be developed in the United States, attention
was paid to the preventive effects of liability law and its influence on the welfare of
society.
In the first paragraph of this paper, Wertheims theory will be explained. The second
paragraph is devoted to the reception of the book by the legal community and to the
second thoughts the author himself had about it. In the third paragraph a comparison
is made between method and application of Wertheim’s theory and contemporary
law-and-economics. The fourth paragraph offers a conclusion.
1 Wertheims theory and its background
This paragraph starts with some biographical notes. Thereafter, the contents of the
dissertation will be explained.
1.1 A short biography
2
Willem Frederik Wertheim was born in 1907 in St. Petersberg in a Jewish-Dutch
family. His father worked there as the director of a local branch of of a Dutch
insurance company. After the Russian revolution the company was nationalized and
the family returned to the Netherlands.
After secondary school, Wertheim started his law studies in Leiden. The choice for
law was motivated by the short duration of its study, taking into account the dire
financial straits of the Wertheim family. Wertheim indicated that he was not really
interested in the study of law, because it failed to present the law in its social context.
He was much more interested in economics, and took an elective course in it after
having been fascinated by the lectures of Van Blom, a professor of economics.
After graduation in 1929, Wertheim decided to write a dissertation under the
supervision of Professor E.M. Meijers, one of the most respected lawyers in The
Netherlands. In that time, law dissertations were of a limited size and could be written
in a relatively short time. Wertheim’s 183 page long work was certainly no exception
to this rule and it was already defended in 1930. Thereafter, Wertheim moved to the
Dutch East Indies, where he first worked as a civil servant and was appointed as a
professor of law in 1936. After the Second World War an effort of Meijers to provide
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failed. He therefore accepted a professorship in History and Sociology at the
University of Amsterdam, specialising in the study of Asia.
Wertheim’s career as a sociologist was a highly successful one and he earned
himself an international reputation in the study of non-Western societies. His
experiences during the Indonesian struggle for independence influenced his political
viewpoints, and he became even notorious for his leftist thoughts. Many obituaries
mentioned that he had taken Wertheim until short before his death, before he
managed to see the mistakes of Mao Zedong. Wertheim died in 1998.
1.2 The foundation of liability law: Wertheims economic approach
The dissertation contains two parts. The first part is devoted to the legal foundation of
extra-contractual liability. In the second part the relation between the theory and
black letter law is investigated. Because Wertheim wrote in the Dutch language, no
literal quotations are given. All the time I have represented his statements into
English, staying as close as possible to their original meaning.
Wertheim argued that he was not the first one to take an economic approach to law
and named Victor Mataja and René Demogue as his predecessors. In 1888, Mataja
had published Das Recht des Schadenersatzes vom Standpunkte der
Nationalökonomie.
3 In Wertheims eyes, however, Mataja did not go far enough
because he allegedly regarded the economic viewpoint as just one of the viewpoints
possible.
4 The authoritative legal scholar Demogue, who wrote a seven-volume
Traité des Obligations, is mentioned several times. It does not become clear,
however, what his influence on Wertheim has been and it is doubtful whether there
was some influence at all.
Wertheim contended that until the middle of the nineteenth century, the authors had
agreed upon the foundation of liability law. This foundation lay in the principle of guilt.
Thereafter, however, the scholars still agreed on the how of liability law, but no longer
shared their opinions on why.
Most authors invoked fairness as a governing principle. According to Wertheim
fairness is a useful tool if questions of how are concerned, but it is not helpful if an
explanation is to be found. He argued that the aim of the law is the promotion of the
common good, which is only possible through the gratification of desires. Those
desires might be material, but might be desires of the mind or the soul as well. Only
individuals can experience desires, but an interpersonal comparison of those dsires
is possible and therefore it can be stated that the common good is promoted by a
maximal gratification of individual desires.
The former is not to say that feelings concerning fairness do not have a place in
Wertheims theory. They even have a twofold function. In the first place they provide
for an intuitive judgment about whether a rule is in the general interest. In the second
place they are the basis in which a particular type of psychological desires rest,
namely the altruistic desires. For example, individuals are supposed to derive a
certain amount of utility from the fact that justice is done to others.
Wertheim pretended to apply a deductive approach. The desirability of a rule could
allegedly be explained by logical deduction from the postulated assumptions. The
aspiration is to be as honest as possible in showing the relation of the rule with the
human desires, and to make it clear that in this way a maximal fulfilment of needs will
be obtained.
5 The extra-contractual liability for damage serves as an illustration of
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In Wertheims point of view the foundations of economic life are the following:
6
I. A maximal fulfilment of needs can only be obtained by a maximization
of human labour, which should be steered into the right direction.
II. Certainty about the performance of this labour will only be obtained, if
simultaneously the fulfilment of the needs of the labouring individual is
realized.
III. Generally it holds that pursuing one’s own interest will result in the
activities that are most useful from an economic point of view.
Thus, welfare is the result of production and production takes place if it is in the
interest of individuals to realize this. The task of the law is, according to Wertheim, to
stimulate the human selfishness in an artificial way, whenever this is needed.
A next economic law that is invoked by Wertheim is the law of diminishing utility,
which shows why the spread of losses makes sense.
7 If one person has to bear all
the losses, not only the least important needs will be stopped to be satisfied, but the
loss will also interfere with desires of a more vital importance. If, on the contrary, the
damage is spread over many, everyone will be hurt only in his least urgent need.
Our society is built on an individualistic pattern and this leads to the principle that
everyone has to bear his own damage. This did not hold for primitive societies,
because in those societies damages were spread along the collectivity. In our
society, however, an overkill of collectivisation would lead to too much control and
coercion, albeit that in practice a collective spread of damages often is realized by
means of insurance and particular regulations.
Referring to Mataja, Wertheim indicates that the principle that everyone has to bear
his own damage generally has the result that an incentive to prevent an accident is
provided to the individual that is in the best position to do so. Usually it is the owner
of a good that is in the best position to take precautions.
8 The relocation of damage
can result in an improved fulfilment of needs because it is conceivable that it results
in the loss being borne by somebody who is in a better position to do so. The most
important thing, however, is the indirect effect: the relocation of damage might result
in more favourable incentives.
The desirability of a legal rule can be demonstrated by showing the relation of the
rule with the human desires and to clarify that it leads to a maximal fulfilment of
needs. Wertheim contended that the deductive approach he defends, is sensitive in
the sense that a tiny mistake in assumptions or conclusions might have severe
consequences. Therefore, he still regarded feelings about fairness as an important
tool for making the necessary corrections.
1.3 Incentive to an advantageous activity
In the second chapter of his dissertation Wertheim argued that the first foundation of
liability is to give incentives for an advantageous activity. This is what he called the
activity principle. The prospect of an obligation to pay damages is likely to influence
the behaviour of a potential tortfeasor. This is not because we expect that the
obligation will result in a remorseful tortfeasor who repents. Only criminal law might
possibly have this effect. The effect of liability law is one of general prevention.
Wertheim agreed with Hold von Ferneck, whom he cites: ‘Nicht concrete sondern
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9 On the
other hand, he was critical about Petrazycki, who allegedly exaggerated the extents
to which legal rules function as norms.
10 The preventive effect results from the
prospect of reward and punishment, not just from the fact that a particular act is
labelled as wrongful. If legal rules really would function as norms, it would be left
unexplained why tort law is needed besides criminal law, since this provides for clear
norms.
Wertheim differed from Mataja in the respect that he rejected the opinion that
prevention requires that a disadvantageous result is the certain consequence of a
tortuous act, and therefore only works in case of intentional torts.
11 Liability for
negligent acts can equally have a useful influence on human activity and therefore
one should not only take the undesirability of a result into account but also the
chance that this will be realized. Wertheim meant, however, that the optimistic nature
of man bars an objective estimation of probabilities. A probability of 50% will often be
estimated to be 25%, while a chance of 10% might be neglected altogether.
In chapter III alternative foundations for liability are discussed.
12 Wertheim objected
to ability to pay as a criterion for allocating damages. If the aim is to improve the
position of economically weaker parties, tort law is a tool that works irregularly while
progressive taxes might do a much better job.
13 Redress cannot be the foundation
either.
14 As opposed to the Middle Ages the personal desire for revenge is no longer
of utmost importance, and the rest of the society does not have strong feelings as to
victim compensation by means of liability law either.
In his fourth chapter Wertheim pursues his aim of reducing the different foundations
for liability that have been mentioned in the literature, to the fundamental foundation
of giving incentives for advantageous activity. The suggested foundations to be
discussed are guilt, endangerment, control, and interest.
Wertheim regards it as evident that prevention makes sense in case of guilt, since in
Dutch tort law guilt includes wrongfulness and wrongfulness plus guilt implies
undesirability.
Endangerment as such cannot be the legal foundation, because lawful competition
also results in damage. In the context of the activity principle, however, it is clear that
liability stops where it interferes with a more useful activity.
Mataja already had argued that it might be useful to regard who was in control
regarding the damage. In this context vicarious liability is relevant, such as the
liability of parents for children and of employers for employees. The principle of
activity then results in a higher degree of awareness, a more careful selection of
personnel, etcetera.
Taking interest as legal foundation means that the one who has the most interest in
the occurrence of an act, also has to bear its negative consequences. This point can
be applied in the context of production.
15 According to Wertheim, a restrained role of
government – laissez faire, laissez passer – generally leads to the benefit of the
whole society, although disturbances may occur. It might happen that the costs of
accidents are not accounted for in the costs of production. If, however, these costs
have to be borne by the entrepreneur, they will become part of the production costs.
If liability results in such a decline of profits that the company is no longer profitable,
this shows that it was right to curb the activity. In this context two points should be
taken into account. The first is that perverse effects on prevention by the victim
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question. The most profitable company has proven itself to be the most viable, and if
this company has to compensate the damages of the other, a more useful activity
would be sacrificed at the benefit of a less useful one. A free competition with all its
consequences is in the interest of maximal productivity.
16
Bringing benefits and harms into one hand is important in other contexts as well.
Buying a dog might result in a nuisance for the neighbours and if the owner is not
confronted with this harm, then an incongruity between his private interest and that of
society will result.
17
Wertheim finally concluded that liability for the one whose interest is served by the
activity that causes harm, again simply is an application of the activity principle.
18
Wertheim opposed the supporters of endangerment theories who had argued that
liability could be based on the performance of an activity, regardless of any interest.
19
He is of the opinion that an actor always has an interest in the act he performs, at
least ex ante. It is psychologically unthinkable that somebody performs an act without
expecting that it will maximize the fulfilment of his needs.
20
2 The reception of Wertheim’s ideas
Three topics will be discussed in this paragraph. The first is the attention for
Wertheim’s dissertation among lawyers. The second refers to the debate in
sociological circles, which was stimulated for a while by Pot’s dissertation in 1960.
Finally, it will be discussed how Wertheim himself looked back at his dissertation.
2.1 The legal debate
The renowned law professors Wolfsbergen and Langemeijer both wrote a critical
review of Wertheim’s dissertation.
21
Wolfsbergen indicated that he would not debate with Wertheim on the promotion of
the common good as the aim of the law, since Wertheim had postulated this goal as
an axiom. Wolfsbergen doubted, however, whether it could provide the sole
foundation of liability law and attempted to give some counterexamples. He argued
that it would be socially useful if state organisations would nationalize the property of
an international holding company without compensation. Moreover, competition
would be undesirable because it would inevitably result in monopolization and the
formation of trusts.
Other remarks of Wolfsbergen seem to be less debatable. He points out that the
existence of accident insurance undermines incentives for prevention, since
employees tend to take less care if they are insured.
22 Moreover, their focus will be
less on the cure of their disease and therefore their recovery is likely to take more
time. Wolfsbergen adds that even if the economic disadvantages of the insurance
would be higher than the benefits, fairness – allegedly so much defamed by
Wertheim – would suffice to maintain the current existence of obligatory insurance.
                                                
16 Idem, p. 68.
17 Idem, p. 69.
18 Idem, p. 76.
19 Idem, p. 77.
20 Idem, pp. 77-78.
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overeenkomst (Review of Wertheim’s dissertation), Themis 1931, pp. 285-297. G.E.
Langemeijer, Boekbespreking (Book review), Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en
Registratie 3187, 1931, pp. 52-54.
22 See Wolfsbergen, o.c., p. 292.
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Wolfsbergen noted that the public at large is not much interested in liability law,
which proofs that only the relation between the tortfeasor and his victim is relevant.
Therefore, victim compensation must be the most important need that is satisfied by
liability law.
24
Langemeijer was equally critical. He did not regard Wertheim’s thesis concerning the
common good as goal and standard of the law as obviously wrong.
25 This thesis,
however, would be easier to apply to inheritance law than to liability law. Inheritance
law indeed serves economic goals, because the fact that a testate may decide upon
the fate of his estate stimulates him to acquire this capital in the first place.
26
Langemeijer shared Wolfsbergen’s opinion that compensation rather than prevention
is the aim of the liability law. He accused Wertheim of finding a public law justification
for the payment of damages, thereby removing himself miles apart from the reality of
the law. If prevention were the goal, it would not be left to the victim to claim
damages. Moreover, the compensation than should be proportional to the
dangerousness and carelessness of the act, rather than to the damage as it
occurred.
Langemeijer applied a more positive tone where he reviewed Wertheim’s opinions
concerning strict liability. He agreed with the author’s vision on vicarious liability for
employers and with the idea that damage should be borne by the person who is in
the best position to obtain insurance.
It should be added that Langemeijer five years later admitted that his review had
been too negative and that, on second thoughts, the opinion that law serves the
common good is maintainable for the whole of the law.
27
Wolfsbergen, on the contrary, kept on insisting that the acceptance of general
prevention as a goal ignores that not the economic useful, but first and foremost
justice determines the law.
28
An important criterion for judging the reception of Wertheim’s ideas obviously is their
influence on liability law. The conclusion can only be this influence is all but absent.
In the exceptional cases in which Wertheim was cited at all, the only aim appeared to
be to criticize his opinions and consequently present the ideas of the author as a
more acceptable alternative. For example, R.J. Polak argued that to search for the
foundation of tort liability in an economic motive is equal to the denial of its legal
character.
29 It could not provide for a legal right of the victim, but only allowed him to
take profit from the principle.
W.J. Slagter spent a considerable number of pages for an attack on Wertheim in his
dissertation on the foundation of tort law.
30 His first remark is that Wertheim fails to
distinguish public law and private law. Liability law is private law that serves to protect
the individual victim, no public law that protects the whole community against
                                                
23 Idem, p. 296.
24 Idem, p. 294-295.
25 See Langemeijer, o.c., p. 53.
26 Compare Wertheim, dissertation, p. 177.
27 See G.E. Langemeijer, Een belangwekkende theorie op het gebied der algemeene
rechtsleer (An important theory in the area of the general theory of law), Nederlands
Juristenblad, 1 februari 1936, p. 95.
28 See A. Wolfsbergen, Onrechtmatige daad (Tort), Universitaire Pers Leiden, Leiden, 1946,
p. 4.
29 See R.J. Polak, Aanspraak en aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad (Claim and liability
out of tort law), dissertation University of Amsterdam, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willlink, Zwolle, 1949, p.
8.
30 See W.J. Slagter, De rechtsgrond van de schadevergoeding bij onrechtmatige daad (The
legal foundation of damage paymenst in tort law), dissertation Leiden University, Luctor et
Emergo, Leiden, 1952, pp. 159-176.
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31 Wertheim misused damage payments to serve as punishments, and
his focus on general prevention brought him at the domain of the criminal law.
32 In
the second place, being wrongful is not the same as being objectionable from an
economic perspective. Not all legal norms are aimed at pursuing economic aims,
since some have social or moral goals.
33 In the third place, Slagter argued that the
activity principle cannot explain the existence of strict liability. In cases of strict
liability, such as the vicarious liability that employers bear for their employees, the
liable person cannot avoid the damage and therefore prevention as a goal makes no
sense.
34 Apparently, Slagter overlooked the point that strict liability might provide for
incentives for reduction of the probability of damage.
An exception to the rule of neglect of or negative attitude towards Wertheim, was his
high school friend Carel Vigelius. Vigelius elaborated upon the idea of prevention as
a goal of tort law, arguing that the foundation of damage in liability law was exactly
the same as the foundation of punishment in criminal law. In both fields it amounted
to special prevention and particularly general prevention.
35
The only other author that wholeheartedly agreed on a number of Wertheim’s main
points was J.M.M. Maeijer.
36 He agreed on the point that while the principle that
everyone has to bear his own damage fits well in our individualistic society, a certain
amount of collectivisation makes sense.
37 Maeijer also shared the opinion that
prevention is a goal of tort law, although he regarded this goal as only
subordinated.
38 He is definite in his opinion that Wertheim was right in stating that the
transfer of damages on the basis of ability to pay, is a very poor method for the
mitigation of the discrepancies in society.
39
2.2 The sociological debate
A short revival in the attention for Wertheim’s dissertation occurred in 1960, when
H.J. Pot published a dissertation Maatschappij en Recht (Society and Law) on the
effect of law on society.
40 In this work, also paid extensive attention to an article
Kernvragen van wetgeving (Fundamental question of legislation) that Wertheim had
published in 1935.
41
Pot was critical about lawyers who aim at determining the contents of the law on the
basis of legal principles, without taking the effect of laws on society into account.
Wertheim, who pretended to do the latter, is similar to other lawyers in the respect
that his main goals were in the ethical domain.
42 Wertheim stated that the law can
                                                
31 Idem, p. 167.
32 Idem, p. 170.
33 Idem, p. 171.
34 Idem, p. 173.
35 See.C. Vigelius, De elementen van artikel 1401 BW (The elements of article 1401 Dutch
Civil Code). In: Rechtskundige Opstellen door oud-leerlingen aangeboden aan prof. Meijers
(Liber amicorum Prof. Meijers), 1935, blz. 831.
36 See J.M.M. Maeijer, Matiging van schadevergoeding (Mitigation of damage paymants),
dissertation Catholic University Nijmegen, Louis Vermijs, Breda, 1962.
37 See Maeijer, o.c., pp. 68-69.
38 Idem, pp. 132-133.
39 Idem, p. 139.
40 See H.J. Pot, Maatschappij en Recht: Beschouwingen over de maatschappelijke werking
van het recht als studieobject der rechtswetenschap (Society and Law: Views on the social
effect of law as an object of study for the science of law), dissertation University Leiden, H.D.
Tjeenk Willink, Haarlem, 1960.
41 W.F. Wertheim, Kernvragen van Wetgeving (Fundamental questions of legislation). In:
Rechtskundige Opstellen door oud-leerlingen aangeboden aan prof. Meijers (Liber amicorum
Prof. Meijers), 1935, pp. 716-792. Cited below as Kernvragen.
42 See Pot, o.c., p. 55.
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normative approach is that there is hardly any room left for actual research on the
effects of law.
43 The empirical data that supported Wertheim’s pretension that liability
law has a preventive effect clearly was insufficient.
44
Another point of critique was that Wertheim was too much focused on proving that
his deductive approach yields the same results as could be obtained with the
traditional approach, that was based on sense of justice. As a consequence,
Wertheim was reasoning towards his goal and hardly developed any new viewpoints
as to the desirable contents of the law.
2.3 Wertheim’ s retrospective
Three themes can be recognized in later publications, in which Wertheim was critical
about his own dissertation. In the first place he was not so much interested anymore
in applying a deductive method as well as in the study of the effects of law, which he
regarded to be a task of the sociology of law. In the second place he is no longer
convinced about the congruence between senses of fairness and the demands of the
common good. In the third place he came to regard the concept of man used in his
dissertation as too simple
As to the first point, the article Kernvragen van wetgeving already indicated a change
of mind. Here Wertheim admitted that although in his dissertation he had pretended
to recognize the effect of law on society, he had tested his theory on the basis of the
contents of law and not on the basis of its functioning. In reply to Pot he agreed with
the point that he had failed to make a sharp distinction between Sein and Sollen,
since he had been guilty of making normative judgments about the law
45
As to the second point, in his 1961 article on the social effects of the law -  De
maatschappelijke werking van het recht – Wertheim cast doubts about the non-
problematic concept of the common good that he had used in his dissertation.
Moreover, he had been of the belief that law is aimed at the promotion of this
common good. Already in his 1935 article Kernvragen, Wertheim had come to
recognize that legislation often is not enacted with the common good in mind, but
may well be the result of a collision of numerous interests.
46 The common good could
no longer been regarded as the only founding criterion for the law. In the law all type
of results can be found that are not directly related to the fulfilment of needs. Law is
also under the influence of ethical notions in society, of constitutional outcomes and
of all kind of cultural factors.
47 Like Bentham did with his criterion “the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of men”, he had wrongly suggested in his
dissertation that the common good would amount to a simple sum of interests. In
reality, many rate their individual interest or group interest higher than the general
interest. Others are of the opinion that immoral needs should be left out, that it should
be required that the fulfilment of needs further cultural interests, or that a just
fulfilment of needs is concerned. Wertheim regarded it as problematic that in his
dissertation his focus had been on showing how his analysis could yield the same
results as could have been obtained by the traditional method through senses of
justice.
48 Hereby he had introduces an ethical element that put up smokescreens
around the real issue, namely the empirical question about the effects of the law.
                                                
43 Idem, p. 67.
44 Idem, p. 68.
45 W.F. Wertheim, De maatschappelijke werking van het recht (The social effect of the law),
Mens en maatschappij, 1961, p. 260. Cited below as Maatschappelijke werking.
46 See Wertheim, Kernvragen, p. 771.
47 Idem, p. 785.
48 See Wertheim, Maatschappelijke werking, p. 258.
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Lundstedt. In Kernvragen, Wertheim indicated that he shared Lundstedt’s objections
to the concept of the homo economicus.
49 The Benthamite vision that human acts are
a result of an exact and conscious calculation of pleasure and pain creates the fiction
of the homo economicus, which does not fit into twentieth century law. Man is not an
isolated individual, but the plaything of countless social influences.
50 Moreover, he is
ambivalent and sometimes irresistibly attracted to danger or even to the certainty of
pain.
51 The consequence of these second thoughts was that Wertheim came to see
the influence of civil law as restricted to the economic domain.
52 This brought him to
criticize not only the science of economics, but also the old ideal of laissez faire,
laissez passer. Any legal rule interferes with this principle.
3 The dissertation from the viewpoint of contemporary law-and-economics
It goes without saying that Wertheim, who had received no mathematical and hardly
any economic training, could not be expected to develop an economic analysis that
comes close to the rigour with which it is performed nowadays. But as Ronald Coase
and Richard Posner have shown, formal rigour is no necessary condition for the
development of path-breaking views. An interesting issue is whether Wertheim
predated some of the insights of contemporary law and economics, and whether his
conclusion about the optimal rules corresponds with the present thoughts. In the first
part of this paragraph Wertheims goals, hypothesis and methodology, as presented
in Part I of his dissertation will be discussed. The second part of this paragraph is,
like Part II of the dissertation, devoted to the applications of his theory on liability law.
3.1 Goals, hypothesis, and methodology
A first issue is the main contribution that is expected from economics. Did Wertheim
belief in correct predictions of the influence of legal rules on individual behaviour? If
so, did those predictions serve as a tool for developing those legal rules that would
allow the aim of a maximal fulfilment of needs would be reached? Or is economics
rather a tool that allows a check on the internal logic and coherence of a legal
system?
In this respect there is some ambivalence in Wertheims work, which corresponds
with the ambivalence that exists in law-and-economics. As indicated above,
Wertheim on the one hand pleads for research into the effects of the law, while on
the other hand he is sceptical about the possibility to base legislation on this
research. In his dissertation he did not offer any empirical proof for the alleged effects
of the law, but this did not restrain him from making statements about the desirability
of concrete legal rules on the basis of conclusions derived from his deductive system.
The parallel with law-and-economics is obvious. The development of a positive
economic theory is a praiseworthy endeavour that is propagated in law-and-
economics as well, but the practical value of the economic analysis of law impossibly
can be found only here. To which extent individuals really act in accordance with the
predictions derived from economic models, is an issue of empirical research that has
yet to be settled.
53 Like Wertheim in his dissertation, law-and-economics scholars
                                                
49 See Wertheim, Kernvragen, pp. 748-749.
50 Idem, p. 749.
51 See Wertheim, Maatschappelijke werking, p. 82.
52 See Wertheim, Kernvragen, p. 761.
53 D. Dewees, D. Duff en M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the
Facts Seriously, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, provides for an overview of empirical
support for the economic analysis of (part of) liability law.
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logically follow from the assumptions stated in their deductive models.
An additional explanation for the existence of the parallel just described might be
found in the ideological effects of economic theories. Nineteenth century economic
theories arguing for a restrictive role of government in economic life clearly
influenced the vision of law that was expressed in Wertheim’s dissertation and it is
equally clear that those theories influenced the black letter law of their times. Pleas
for a restraint government are common in law-and-economics as well, and it should
come as no surprise that law-and-economics scholars tend to derive their examples
of efficient law from nineteenth century court cases.
54
A similar analysis can be made as to the correspondence that exists concerning the
alleged orientation of the law towards the common good. Wertheim originally was of
the opinion that the law can be understood on the basis of its goal to promote the
common good. In its essence this is in accordance with Richard Posner’s well-known
thesis that the Common Law can be explained from a strive towards wealth
maximisation.
55 Posner uses this concept of wealth maximisation as his personal
variant on the utilitarian principle, measuring not in terms of utility but in terms of
money. One of the reasons to do so, is to facilitate interpersonal comparisons. The
fact that interpersonal comparisons of utility are hard to make is an issue that is taken
too light-heartedly by Wertheim. For the economic analysis of concrete rules of
liability law, however, this distinction in measuring rods is of a very limited
importance. On the contrary, there is an important difference between the law-and-
economics approach and the adjusted ideas on welfare that Wertheim presented in
Kernvragen van wetgeving. The amendments he made there, concerning the
exclusion of immoral desires, demands of justice, and the like, are not common in
law-and-economics.
56
An interesting point is that Posner merely argues that the Common Law, that is judge
made law, is efficient, while statute law on the other hand is supposed to be
inefficient. As has been elaborated in public choice theory, statute law often is the
result of rent-seeking by groups that have either a particular conception of the
general interest I mind, or simply further their particular interests. Wertheim does not
clearly distinguish judge made law and statute law, but in accordance with the public
choice vision he connects his subsequent doubts about the orientation of the law
towards the coming good with statute law allegedly being the result of a collision of
group interests.
57
Another remarkable parallel exists as to Posner’s efficiency-as-justice-thesis.
58 While
Wertham regarded senses of fairness as an intuitive judgment about the conformity
of a legal rule with the general interest, Posner argued that notions about justice
actually are judgments about efficiency. Posner’s thesis is often criticized, and as
indicated Wertheim later had his doubts about his own variation. On close scrutiny,
however, Wertheim’s position is not that odd. It should be considered that he wrote in
a different time, and moreover referred back to Mataja’s work from 1888. In this light
it is certainly possible that the ideologies that pleaded for a restrictive role for
                                                
54 The clearest example of course is R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of
Law and Economics, 1960, pp. 1-44.
55 See R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4
th edition, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1992.
56 Although admittedly the qualification of illicitly acquired utility as immoral and the need for
its exclusion from the social welfare function is vehemently debated in the economic analysis
of criminal law. See D.D. Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and
Why It Matters, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, for an overview of this
discussion.
57 See Wertheim, Kernvragen, p. 711.
58 See on this thesis R.A. Posner, The Economics of Justice, 2
nd ed., Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983, pp. 88-115.
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individual interests, might have influenced the ethical judgments of their time.
A next point is the similarity between Wertheim and law-and-economics where the
relation between norm and fact is concerned. The relationship between positive and
normative approaches in law-and-economics is complicated and continuously up for
discussion. On the one hand it is pretended that the aim is the explanation of the law
out of a pursuit of the common good, respectively wealth maximization. This is a
positive approach, as is empirical research on the effects of the law. On the other
hand, it is argued that black letter law should be in accordance with the goals that
have been postulated by the scholars and then a normative approach pops up. Like
Posner in his Economic Analysis of Law, Wertheim in his dissertation actually was
mostly involved in justifying and evaluating the law from an economic perspective. As
indicated, in retrospect Wertheim had his doubts about his approach at this point.
The last issue to be mentioned here is Wertheim’s opinion that progressive taxes are
a better way of redistribution from rich to poor, than a favourable attitude of the judge
towards weaker parties is.
59 This is evidently in accordance with the reigning
viewpoint on this issue in law-and-economics, as presented by Kaplow and Shavell.
60
In order to compare Wertheim’s methodology with the dominant neo-classical
approach in law-and-economics the three main characteristics of the latter approach
have to be distinguished. Those characteristics are methodological individualism, the
hypothesis of rationality, individual property rights, and the existence of explicit or
implicit markets.
Methodological individualism states that individuals are the starting point of the
analysis. Only individuals are able to act and welfare is measured on the basis of
individual welfare. In his dissertation, Wertheim applies this when he argues that in
order to motivate to perform labour, it is needed to realise the maximal satisfaction of
the needs of the individual whose labour one is considering.
61 Moreover, he defines
the common good as a maximum of fulfilments of individual needs.
62
The hypothesis of rationality implies that individuals order their preferences, relate
these to the limit of their possibilities given the restraints, and finally choose on the
basis of this balancing. In law-and-economic it is added that it is not decisive whether
individuals make such calculations as a matter of fact, but whether it is possible to
predict their behaviour by acting as-if this is the case. At this point there is a
principled methodological difference with Wertheim, who requires that already at the
level of the assumptions conformity with human behaviour should exist.
In being sceptical about the human ability to estimate chances correctly, Wertheim
deviates from the neo-classical model, but is more in line with behavioural law and
economics.
Obviously Wertheim does not use the term property rights, which anyway is hard to
translate into Dutch legal terminology. However, I already referred to his viewpoint
that for a maximal production it is required that the performers of the labour maximize
the satisfaction of their needs by working.
63 This indicates that Wertheim recognized
the importance of individual property rights in body and labour. Elsewhere, Wertheim
indicates that legal certainty is required in order to make use of al the energies in
society, since individuals should be aware of the fact that they enjoy safe and
undisturbed possession of the goods they have obtained.
64
                                                
59 See Wertheim, dissertation, p. 44.
60 L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, pp. 667-681.
61 See Wertheim, dissertation, p. 14.
62 Idem, p. 7.
63 Idem, p. 14.
64 Idem, p. 72.
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apparent from his statement that productive labour consists of moving goods to the
places where they can be used best.
65
3.2 Applications
The degree to which Wertheim’s goals, hypotheses, and methodology are in
accordance with those of law-and-economics suggests that his statements about the
law will appear to be similar as well. Whether this indeed is the case will be
discussed in this paragraph. The topics under consideration are general insights of
law-and-economics, as well as the more specific subjects of contributory and
comparative negligence, causation, strict liability, liability insurance, and the relation
between liability law and criminal law.
3.2.1 General insights
Apart from the Coase-theorem, that is not really relevant since Wertheim discussed
cases of high transaction costs, the most important tool in the economic analysis of
liability law is the Hand-formula. In Judge Learned Hand’s original formulation liability
exists if B < p * L, where B stands for the burden of precautions, p for probability and
L for loss.
The formula should be interpreted in the sense that p * L is the expected damage,
existing of the sum of all possible extents of damages, multiplied by their
probabilities. This requires among other things the ability to determine the probability
of low frequency events. It is evident that such an explicit formula does not fit into
Wertheim’s assumption that men’s optimistic nature brings him not only to
underestimate probabilities of accidents, but also to neglect small probabilities
completely.
A second explanation for the fact that Wertheim did not anticipate the Hand-formula,
is that he was so obsessed with the aim of prevention that he overlooked the
possibility that the benefits of preventive measures fail to outweigh the costs of care.
This is obvious from his remark that it almost never happens that additional care is
inappropriate.
66 At this point Wertheim was rightly criticized by Pot, who noted that a
heavy liability would rather have a paralysing than a useful effect.
67 It should be
noted here that Wertheim makes an exception to the rule just formulated in case the
possibility of prevention by the victim is relevant, an issue to be discussed in the next
paragraph.
Another issue where Wertheim failed to anticipate contemporary economic analysis
is the so-called level of activity, introduced by Steven Shavell in 1980.
68 Besides the
level of care of tortfeasor and victim, also the intensity with which they perform an
activity is relevant. An owner of a dog can take care by means of precautions like
muzzling, but also lower his activity level by walking his dog less often. Again this
was a point noted by Pot, who correctly blamed Wertheim for taking account of the
first alternative, but failing to notify the second one.
69 An additional consequence of
Shavell’s terminology is that Wertheim’s choice for the expression activity principle is
a bit awkward.
                                                
65 Idem, p. 20.
66 Idem, p. 88.
67 See Pot, o.c., p. 129.
68 See S. Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 Journal of Legal Studies, 1980.
69 See Pot, o.c., p. 126, nt 1.
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spreading, in the sense that a loss is a lower burden if it is spread over a larger group
of people and/or is spread over time.
70
3.2.2 Contributory and comparative negligence
Wertheim had a strong interest in the issue how in cases where both tortfeasor and
victim could have taken precautionary measures (bilateral accidents in the law-and-
economics jargon), the damage should be apportioned over both. According to
Wertheim, not every obligation to pay damages is useful, because the sense of
prevention is limited to prevention towards the victim.
71 The pedestrian would not
haven been run over by the car, if he had not crossed the street at this point and at
this moment of time. The sparks emitted by the locomotive would not have caused
damage to the owner of the wood, if he had taken the necessary precautions to
protect his timber against fire.
72 Moreover, if a victim has to bear part of his loss, this
not only effects prevention, but also results in the spreading of damage.
73
Two issues are regarded as relevant here. In the first place it is important to find out
how far both acts are apart from the economic ideal. Should motorists be more
careful in driving, or should pedestrians be more careful in crossing the street? In the
second place it should be found out how likely it is that the prospect of having to bear
a loss will result in the desired behaviour.
74
Wertheim’s pleads for comparative negligence as a tool for giving both parties the
right incentives. This outcome is not wrong to modern standards, but Wertheim
formulated it to hastily. There are a few drawbacks for rules that apportion loss over
both parties as opposed to a rule of contributory negligence that bars a negligent
victim completely from receiving compensation. A rule of comparative negligence is
more complex to administer, requires more information, and thus is more expensive
to apply. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a compromise leads to optimal
incentives for care.
75 It could for example cause both parties to take insufficient
precautions.
Nevertheless, many regard compromises like the one supported by Wertheim as
efficient because they take into account that judges might err in applying the correct
standard for contributory negligence.
76 The consequences of such an error are only
of a limited extent if they merely result in a limited shift in liability and not in a
complete reversal.
A related issue that is worth to mention, is Wertheim’s viewpoint on insolvency in
case there are multiple tortfeasors.
77 Like contemporary law-and-economics,
78 he
pleads for joint and several liability for the tortfeasors, so that the tortfeasor who is
solvent can he held liable for all of the damage.
3.2.3 Causation
                                                
70 Compare G. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale
Law Journal, 1961, pp. 499-553.
71 See Wertheim, dissertation, p. 30.
72 Idem, pp. 30-31.
73 Idem, p. 33.
74 Idem.
75 See R.A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 Journal of Legal Studies, 1972, p. 29.
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Wertheim’s viewpoint regarding the theory of Demogue-Besier, and on the other
hand Grady’s uncertainty theorem.
79 The theory Demogue-Besier requires a specific
relationship between the wrongful character of an act and the damage. If somebody
drives a car without a license and an accident happens that is not his fault, then a
causal relationship as required by Demogue-Besier is lacking. It is not considered to
be relevant that it is unlawful and therefore ipso facto tortuous to drive without
license. Wertheim offered many arguments against the theory Demogue-Besier, and
all the time his crucial point was that it results in a limitation of liability and therefore
in a limitation of the effect of tort law on liability.
The law-and-economics literature urges a different conclusion. The issue is illustrated
with the help of the case Bolton v. Stone. Suppose that the standard for negligence
requires the owner of a cricket field to build a ten feet high fence. Experience has
shown that given the low frequency of cricket balls crossing such a fence, a higher
one is not cost-justified. Suppose now that the owner is negligent by erecting a fence
that is only nine feet high. It is clear that he will be held liable for damage caused by
balls crossing the fence at a height of between nine and ten feet. If those balls hit a
window or a passer-by, the damage would not have occurred if the owner were not
negligent. If, however, the owner is also liable for all balls that leave the field at a
height of ten feet, a slight deviation from the standard of care might result in a
considerable rise in the number of cases in which one will be held liable. This would
not be a problem if it could always be determined with precision what is needed to
avoid negligence, because in that case a potential tortfeasor could avoid liability by
simply follow this guideline. Unfortunately, however, in practice the negligence rule is
not so precise. Fear of liability will therefore bring a potential tortfeasor to stay on the
safe side and to take a higher amount of care than is optimal from an economic point
of view.
3.2.4 Strict liability
Wertheim was particularly interested in the vicarious liability of employers for damage
caused by the employees. His arguments for this strict liability are similar to those
used in law-and-economics.
80 In the first place, employer’s liability results in bringing
benefits and harms into the same hand,
81 or in modern terminology will lead to an
internalisation of negative external effects. In the second place, the employer
generally is most able in foreseeing the damage, and therefore he is also in the best
position to take precautions or to buy insurance. In the third place, liability for
subordinates will give an incentive for a careful selection and monitoring of
personnel. An additional advantage of strict liability is that it is often hard to prove
negligence and strict liability might therefore result in a saving of trial costs.
82
3.2.5 Liability insurance
A well-known problem in the economic analysis of liability and insurance is the
undermining of the preventive effect of tort law by moral hazard. If the tortfeasor no
longer has to pay for the damage he causes, an incentive to avoid this damage
disappears.
                                                
79 See for the latter M. Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence
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liability. The latter is not a violation of the principle of prevention being a foundation of
liability, since the contracting party will not allow liability to be excluded without
receiving an equivalent benefit in return.
83 Insurance does undermine the preventive
effect, but this is partly compensated by the effect of more risk spreading. However,
insurance must be forbidden in case of intentional acts or gross negligence, and
moreover the insured should be made to bear a proportional part of the damage
himself.
84
Again, Wertheim’s opinions are generally correct, but as his critic Pot observed,
85 a
few important points are neglected. Whether prevention really is undermined by
liability insurance depends on a comparison of respective influence on behaviour by
judge and insurer. It is possible, at least in theory, that monitoring of the behaviour of
the insured by the insurer yields the optimal incentives.
86 Moreover, if Wertheim
would be correct in his doubts about the human ability to determine the probabilities
of accidents correctly, this would yield an additional argument for insurance. On the
basis of the data he has available, the insurer is in a unique position to calculate
probabilities. Through his premium settings he provides this information, and the
incentives based on it, to the potential tortfeasors.
3.2.6 Liability law versus criminal law
The relation between liability law and criminal law is not so much an application of
Wertheim’s theory, as well as a theoretical issue that already is analysed in the first
part of the dissertation.
The modern economic analysis of criminal law started with Gary Becker, who argued
that a balance should be made between on the one hand the costs of criminal acts to
society, and on the other hand the costs of enforcing the law.
87
Wertheim’s analysis runs as follows.
88 The severity of the punishment is mainly
depending on the proportion between the benefit that an act is prevented and the
disadvantage that in particular cases the convicted will be made to suffer, the latter
always being a wrong from the viewpoint of society. The higher the interest in
preventing the act, that is to say the more anti-social it is, the more one is prepared to
spend in order to prevent it. The punishment therefore is somewhat proportional to
the degree of undesirability.
An important difference is that while Becker regards fines to bring along hardly if any
social costs, Wertheim is of a different opinion. On the basis of the theory of declining
marginal utility, he points out that the payment of a fine by the individual to the state
always results in a net loss of welfare.
89
Particularly remarkable is that Wertheim considers punishment to have always a
shaming element.
90 This fact limits the applicability of criminal law. If the members of
society do not regard acts that are legally defined as criminal as objectionable,
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element of punishment has only recently risen to attention.
91
4 Conclusion
With the knowledge of seventy years hindsight it is not hard to find weak spots in
Wertheim’s line of reasoning. Wertheim failed to anticipate the two crucial
breakthroughs in the economic analysis of liability law, namely the Hand-formula and
the Coase-theorem. On a number of issues – like comparative negligence and
insurance – he was on the right track, but his analysis was shallower than that of
contemporary writers.
Taking into account, however, that Wertheim wrote his dissertation back in 1930, in a
period of one year, and when he was only 22 years old, his achievement is
phenomenal. He applied a deductive method based on simplifying assumptions
regarding human behaviour. Like Posner would do, over forty years later, Wertheim
simultaneously used a welfare criterion as explanation and standard for the law, and
strived for economic rationalisations of the positive law.
 It is doubtful whether Wertheim has ever recognised what a pioneering work he had
done. He was aware of the existence of law-and-economics and of attention for
prevention in the economic analysis of liability law, but indicated that he had not kept
up with it.
92 He talked about the shortcomings in his dissertation and doubted
whether he would have received a cum laude in case that possibility had existed at
Leiden University at that time.
The paradox is that the simplifying assumptions that Wertheim later regarded as
shortcomings – the conviction that the contents of the existing legal rules was in
accordance with the general interest, simplifying assumptions with respect to how
law influences individuals – resulted in the remarkable parallels with contemporary
law-and-economics.
As so often, a lack of an excess of established knowledge combined with what
Wertheim himself labelled as youthful recklessness,
93 were the main ingredients for
the ability to write a strikingly original work. What Wertheim wrote at the age of 22, he
would not have dared to publish anymore five years later, as is shown by Kernvragen
van wetgeving.
It is a pity that the dissertation was written in Dutch and specifically referred to the
Dutch law, and therefore was inaccessible for the Americans who in the 1930s
thought about the economic foundations of the law.
94 By the time the polyglot
Wertheim started to write in other languages his interests had shifted towards
sociology. Undoubtedly, Wertheim would have picked up his research in the social
function of the law in case the intended appointment as a professor in civil law on a
sociological foundation at Leiden University had taken place. It is doubtful, however,
whether the empirical research that Wertheim would have performed in this function
would have been economically orientated. It were exactly the sharp economic
statements in his dissertation that Wertheim now regarded as an inability to nuance
due to his youth. However, 42 years later it would be the same boldness, which
attracted so much attention to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.
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but also his swing in political orientation. Although law-and-economics emphatically is
not a political movement, it is fair to state that the laissez-faire ideology that in the
nineteenth century influenced economic thinking as well as the law, went through a
renaissance in modern law-and-economics. During the economic crisis of 1930s the
perceived need for government interventions in economic life increased. It was not
only Wertheim who became estranged from the economic thoughts of the nineteenth
century, but the dominant ideology changed also and limited the room for economic
thinking in the law. The Dutch legal historian Govert van den Bergh indeed explained
the lack of attention for the dissertations of Wertheim and Pot out of the separation
that had grown between law and economics, as well as out of the radical left-wing
viewpoints Wertheim had developed after the Second World War and that made him
unaccepted in certain circles.
 95
In retrospect Wertheim’s theory looks so modern, because decades before the
emergence of modern law-and-economics in the United States he developed an
approach that is similar in its essence. The paradox is that for an important part this
is the case because he reverted to the work of Mataja from 1888.
The importance of Wertheim is that he anticipated a considerable amount of ways of
thinking and conclusions of law-and-economics. On the other hand, he did not in any
respect influence any law-and-economics scholar directly, and neither do his ideas
urge us to adjust any of the current insights in law-and-economics. His dissertation
makes clear, however, that law-and-economics in the Posnerian sense is not at all as
typical American, or depending on the Common Law, as used to be thought.
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